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Abstract 
The article analyses influences on the design of land rental con-
tracts in Poland. Attention is paid to the effect of both the properties 
of the transaction as identified in Transaction Cost Economics 
(asset-specificity, uncertainty, frequency) and the features of the 
institutional environment (legal as well as customary rules) as 
studied by the Economics of Property Rights. The conclusion is that 
institutional influences have a very strong effect and should not be 
disregarded in the explanation of contract choice. 
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Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Artikel werden Einflussfaktoren auf die Gestaltung von 
Bodenpachtverträgen in Polen untersucht. Aufmerksamkeit wird 
sowohl den Eigenschaften der Transaktion gewidmet, die von der 
Transaktionskostenökonomie identifiziert werden (Spezifität, Unsi-
cherheit, Häufigkeit), als auch dem institutionellen Umfeld (formalen 
und informellen Regeln), das die Ökonomie der Verfügungsrechte 
betrachtet. Die Schlussfolgerung ist, dass institutionelle Einflüsse 
sehr bedeutsame Auswirkungen haben und bei der Erklärung der 
Vertragswahl nicht vernachlässigt werden sollten. 
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1. Introduction 
KLEIN, CRAWFORD  and ALCHIAN (1978: 326) claim that 
“[t]he pertinent economic question we are faced with is 
‘What kinds of contracts are used for what kinds of activi-
ties and why?’”. This article seeks to contribute to answe-
ring this question by exploring determinants of contract 
choice in the particular empirical setting of the agricultural 
land market in Poland. 
The motivation for the study lies both at a theoretical and at 
a policy level. As far as theory is concerned, the discussion 
of the determinants of contract choice has in the past been 
characterised by two distinct strands, one looking at the 
institutional environment and the other at the attributes of 
the transaction. Here, attention is paid to both of these areas 
and to the way in which they interact and jointly influence 
contracting decisions. With respect to policy, this approach 
allows the connection between particular laws and norms 
and the actual land contract design chosen by farmers and 
landowners for individual transactions to be established. In 
this way, the consequences of specific institutions can be 
determined clearly and tested against the effects that were 
originally desired by policy makers. Thus, this article con-
stitutes an addition to existing literature on the Polish land 
market, such as PROSTERMAN and ROLFES (2000), WORLD 
BANK (2001) and CHRISTENSEN and LACROIX  (1997) on 
legal setting and land policy, MILCZAREK (2002) on land 
privatisation, FAŁKOWSKI  (2004) on the determinants of 
land rentals, and the annual reports by IERiGZ (various 
years) on land market activity.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the 
theoretical background of the study. Section 3 presents the 
empirical setting and methodological approach. In section 
4, the theoretical considerations are connected with empiri-
cal findings as to the observed relevant properties of land 
transactions and the most influential elements of land and 
land-related legislation in Poland. The article ends with 
conclusions in section 5. 
2. Theoretical approach 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) focuses on the impact 
of the properties of the transaction in determining the choi-
ce of institutional arrangements (governance structures and 
contract designs), while the analysis of institutions and 
property rights regimes regards the incentives and disincen-
tives for particular contracts exerted by the institutional 
framework of a society. In this section, I first present these 
two approaches and then turn to addressing the properties 
of the transaction and relevant institutions in the concrete 
case of land rental contracts. 
2.1 Properties of the transaction and transaction 
costs in TCE 
According to TCE, governance structures form a continuum 
that reaches from the pure spot market (which corresponds 
to the neoclassical “ideal” market) to full vertical integrati-
on in a hierarchy. In between these lie various hybrid 
forms, such as specification contracts, alliances and coope-
ration. Depending on the characteristics of the transaction, 
transaction costs reach a different level under different 
contract forms and economic actors are motivated to select 
the type of contract that minimises their transaction costs in 
an exchange (WILLIAMSON, 1985, 1996). 
For WILLIAMSON  (1996: 105), there are three attributes 
whereby transactions differ: the frequency with which the 
transaction takes place, the uncertainty the transaction is 
subject to and the type and degree of asset-specificity in-
volved in supplying the good or service in question. It is 
advantageous to conduct transactions that are characterised Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 6 
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by high frequency, high uncertainty and/or high asset-
specificity under governance of hierarchical regimes be-
cause these allow for the application of administrative con-
trols. Transactions of low frequency, low uncertainty and 
low asset-specificity, by contrast, are best guided by the 
high incentive intensity provided by markets (WILLIAMSON, 
1996: 103-105). 
Governance structures are associated with distinct contract 
law regimes. Classical contract law is characterised by 
formal features, it is inflexible because it does not allow for 
ex-post adjustments, the identity of the parties does not 
matter, remedies are narrowly described and the envisioned 
mechanism of contract enforcement is court litigation, 
which results in the liquidation of the contract. Hybrid 
governance structures correspond to neoclassical contract 
law, which provides for longer-term contractual relations, 
more flexibility and third party arbitration in case of con-
flicts, which allows the continuity of the contract. Under 
hierarchical governance, relational contracting takes place, 
where the complexity, duration and flexibility is further 
increased and dispute settlement takes place directly be-
tween the involved parties (MACNEIL, 1978; WILLIAMSON, 
1985: 68-72). 
Thus, with increasing frequency, insecurity and asset-
specificity in a transaction, the advantages of flexible, co-
operative, long-term contracting solutions become more 
pronounced as they provide against various contracting 
hazards, while “safe” transactions of low frequency, low 
uncertainty and low asset-specificity are best governed by 
classical contracts that bring a minimum of bureaucracy 
costs. It is important to note that pure Transaction Cost 
Economics reasoning, mostly implicitly, assumes a “neu-
tral” institutional environment that does not discriminate 
against or favour certain contract law regimes. 
2.2 Institutions and property rights 
Transactions take place within the institutional framework 
of a society. Formal institutions are the political, judicial 
and economic rules contained in laws and constitutions that 
are enforced by the state, while informal constraints consist 
of typically unwritten behavioural norms, codes of conduct 
and conventions in society that are based on socially trans-
mitted information (NORTH, 1990: 36-53).  
A subgroup of institutions, namely property rights, regulate 
the relations among actors with respect to the existence and 
use of scarce resources. According to the Economics of 
Property Rights, the value of a good is entirely dependent 
on the rights associated with it; hence two physically iden-
tical goods have different values if they are connected with 
different rights. As a result, the definition of the term 
“transaction” differs from that of TCE in that it is not the 
transfer of the physical good that matters but that of the 
rights associated with it: “When a transaction is concluded 
in the marketplace, two bundles of property rights are ex-
changed” (DEMSETZ, 1967: 347). A second contrast to 
Transaction Cost Economics lies in the fact that in property 
rights literature - instead of assuming a vaguely “neutral” 
institutional setting of private property rights and freedom 
to contract - “[t]he institutional environment in which eco-
nomic activity takes place tends to be specified with preci-
sion. In particular, the existing property relations and the 
exchange, policing, and enforcement costs of contractual 
activities are spelled out in detail for each case studied” 
(FURUBOTN and PEJOVICH, 1972: 1157). In the words of 
NORTH (1990: 52): “Contracts will reflect the incentive-
disincentive structure embedded in the property rights 
structure (and the enforcement characteristics); thus the 
opportunity set of the players and the forms of organization 
they devise in specific contracts will be derived from the 
property rights structure”. 
In this article, I try to bring the two strands of reasoning 
presented above together by arguing that the actual design 
of contracts is the result of the impact of both the properties 
and the institutional environment of transactions and of 
their interplay.  
2.3 Influences on land rental contract choice 
How can the general theoretical reasoning of TCE and 
institutions/property rights approaches as presented above 
be applied to explaining contract choice in agricultural land 
transactions and, more particular, the design of land rental 
contracts? 
First of all, it is necessary to connect the features of land 
rental contracts with the definition of classical, neoclassical 
and relational contracts that TCE operates with. Quite obvi-
ously, rental contracts are all market contracts and, thus, 
cover only a small fraction of the full spectrum of organisa-
tional forms from market to hierarchy. However, within this 
spectrum it is possible to differentiate between contracts 
that lean more towards the classical contract side and con-
tracts that lean more towards the relational contract side. As 
can be extracted from Williamson’s arguments above, the 
trade-off is between more short-term adjustment possibili-
ties and more long-term security. Thus, contracts can be 
classified according to which of these aspects they cater for 
primarily. On the basis of this idea, land rental arrange-
ments ought to be evaluated looking at the three features of 
duration, formalisation and complexity.
1 In this way, they 
can be arranged along a continuum stretching from the 
extreme of short-term, oral and few specifications
2 (repre-
senting the classical contract tendency) to the extreme of 
long-term, written and detailed specifications (representing 
the relational contract tendency). 
Second, it has to be established what forms the properties of 
transactions actually take in land rental transactions. A 
source of uncertainty for the landlord is the possibility of 
shirking by the tenant, e.g. with respect to regular and 
timely rent payments and the proper management of the 
rented land (CHEUNG, 1969a, 1969b; HAYAMI and OTSUKA, 
1993). Tenants may be insecure about the long-term possi-
bility of using rented land and the development of rental 
payments demanded by the landlord. Frequency in land 
transactions depends on how often landowners and tenants 
make or renew contracts. The aspect has two dimensions: 
for a contracting party it matters on the one hand how often 
(re-)contracting with one other transaction partner takes 
                                                           
1   This is in accordance with the argument of ALLEN and LUECK 
(1992), who differentiate between rental contracts in the USA 
according to duration and complexity. 
2   What is meant by specifications is whether the contract con-
tains details on land management practices required of the ten-
ant, the conditions for rental payments and penalties in case 
the contract is violated, etc. Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 6 
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place, on the other hand how often contracts with various 
partners are made in general. Asset-specificity can be 
caused by particular features of the resource land, such as 
permanent investments like fixed drainage or irrigation 
equipment connected to it. It can also be the result of the 
characteristics of the rented plot and the tenant’s farm, 
since how dependent a tenant is on the security of a reliable 
long-term option for using land depends on the share of 
rented land in the total land he farms and the size of the 
rented plot. 
Figure 1 shows the suggested way of associating attributes 
of land transactions with elements of land rental contract 
design. High asset-specificity and high uncertainty are 
expected to lead to longer-term, more formalised and more 
detailed contracts because these provide better security 
against contracting risks. The aspect frequency is displayed 
in parentheses, since its effect is not straight forward. A 
likely reaction of a frequent contractor with many contract-
ing partners would be to extend the duration of each indi-
vidual agreement (and possibly standardise the terms) in 
order to reduce his contracting costs. In turn, of course, it 
has to be considered that long-term contracting reduces the 
frequency of renewing agreements with the same partner.  
As for the institutional framework, it is very common that 
special provisions in legislation address agricultural land 
transactions. Some examples of land policies frequently 
applied are restrictions on land transfers (e.g. to prevent 
excessive land fragmentation or excessive concentration of 
land use or ownership), rights of first refusal for tenants in 
case land is sold, demands concerning land registration, 
special tax arrangements applied to agricultural land and 
special rules for the inheritance of land (cf. OECD, 1998). 
Regulations affecting land transfers may stem not only 
directly from land legislation but also from related areas. 
Thus, social security provisions may connect land transac-
tions with “social” transactions and environmental legisla-
tion may restrict private property rights to land. In addition 
to legal rules, customs about what is regarded as a “fair” 
contract (YOUNG  and BURKE, 2001) or kinship relations 
(SADOULET,  DE  JANVRY  and FUKUI, 1997) can play an 
important role in the design of land rental contracts. 
3. Empirical setting and methodology 
The empirical data used for determining factors of influen-
ce on land rental contracts stems from a survey and three 
case studies carried out in two Polish regions characterised 
by differences in their agricultural structures. In addition to 
survey and case study data, documents and legal texts were 
analysed in order to gain information on land and land-
related legislation in Poland. 
In the first research region, the area of Poznan in western 
Poland, a substantial share of land (about 30%) was used by 
state farms before 1989. The Agricultural Property Agency 
of the State Treasury (AWRSP) sells or rents out this land 
to private farms or, in some cases, delegates this task to the 
gminas
3. The farming structure of Poznan is characterised 
by the coexistence of family farms that are above average 
in size by Polish standards and large scale commercial 
farms that are mostly developed on land formerly used by 
state farms. The second region, the area of Sieradz in cen-
tral Poland, was not greatly influenced by state farms, 
which only occupied a tiny portion of land (about 2%). 
Consequently, the privatisation process did not provoke 
many changes in the farming structure here. The area re-
mains dominated by rather small family farms. 
This study could draw on survey data on these two regions 
that was collected as part of the larger research project 
KATO
4 in 1999. The survey contains observations on 111 
family farms and 37 large farms in Poznan as well as 110 
family farms in Sieradz. The 
time period covered are the 
years from 1989 to 1998. 
Three village case studies 
were conducted in the same 
regions in 2003. Two of the 
villages (referred to here as 
P1 and P2) are located in 
Poznan and one (referred to 
as S) is located in Sieradz. 
Villages P1 and P2 are situ-
ated in the same gmina, in 
which a substantial share of 
the land was used by state 
farms and AWRSP is active 
in renting out and (to a lesser 
degree) selling. P1 is composed mainly of family farms 
with no state farm having existed on the village territory. 
However, former state farm land lies in the immediate sur-
roundings and a cooperative operates in the village, which 
has been selling off land since 1989. P2 is a neighbouring 
village of P1, where a state farm existed alongside family 
farms. Today, these family farms coexist with a large Span-
ish agricultural enterprise that bought and rented in land 
following the privatisation of the former local state farm. In 
village S, there are only family farms. Interviews were 
carried out in the three villages with altogether 37 farmers 
and landowners based on a questionnaire composed of open 
questions guided by a manual. Attention was paid to the 
fact that detailed information on every single land transac-
tion made by the respondents between 1989 and 2003 was 
collected, allowing a “transaction databank” containing the 
characteristics of the transaction and the contract in each 
exchange to be produced. 
                                                           
3   Gminas are the smallest administrative units in Poland. 
4   KATO studied privatisation, liberalisation and restructuring in 
Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Cf. ZILLMER (2002) 
for details on the Polish family farm survey. 
Figure 1.  Association between attributes of land transactions and elements of 
land rental contract design 
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4. Results and interpretation 
As SHELANSKI  and KLEIN’s (1995) overview of research   
in transaction cost economics illustrates, empirical studies 
that explicitly bring together institutional and transaction 
cost explanations of contract choice and test their joint 
explanatory power have so far been rare. In this section, I 
undertake such an approach. To this end, in the first step, 
the properties of land transactions in the empirical setting 
and the relevant attributes of formal and informal institu-
tions are presented. On this basis, expectations as to the 
design of land rental transactions that should be found in 
different contracting situations are formed. In the next step, 
the design of actual contracts observed in survey and case 
studies is defined according to the categories written/oral, 
contracting period and specifications and is interpreted in 
light of the expectations that were formed beforehand.  
4.1 Properties of land rental transactions 
In the case studies and the 
survey, five distinct settings 
with respect to transaction part-
ners in land rentals were ob-
served: (1) transactions be-
tween family farmers, (2) 
transactions between AWRSP 
and family farmers, (3) transac-
tions between the gmina (act-
ing for AWRSP) and family 
farmers, (4) transactions be-
tween other public bodies 
(church, state forestry office, 
landscape park) and family 
farmers and (5) transactions be-
tween AWRSP and large farms. 
As far as the aspect of uncer-
tainty is concerned, transac-
tions between family farmers 
(setting (1)) can be expected to show the lowest degree, 
because farmers who exchange land usually belong to the 
same community and are well informed about each others’ 
past involvement in the land market and general reputation. 
Where AWRSP rents out to family farmers (situation (2)), 
there is higher uncertainty because no personal relationship 
exists between the parties and information about reputations 
will be less direct and reliable. Rentals from the gmina to 
family farmers (situation (3)) can be expected to have un-
certainty levels between those of situation (1) and (2), since 
the gmina is closer to individual farmers than AWRSP but 
still more distant from the community than farmers are 
from each other. The same is true for situation (4). In trans-
actions between AWRSP and large farms (situation (5)), 
uncertainty is probably lower than in situation (2) because 
the chances that there is personal acquaintance between 
large farmers and members of the agency are greater. 
With respect to frequency, it can be expected that individual 
producers, be it family farms or large farms, are not in-
volved in transactions with high frequency. The privatisa-
tion agency AWRSP is a frequent contractor with many 
partners due to being responsible for the allocation of vast 
amounts of land. The gmina probably lies between AWRSP 
and individual farmers. 
The degree of asset-specificity in land transactions was 
studied with respect to the share of rented land of the farm, 
the size of the rented plots and land-connected investments. 
The size of plots rented in reaches from 1 ha to 17 ha in the 
case studies (this information is not present in the survey) 
and the share of rented land in total land reaches from 
100% to 1% for the farms in the survey. The differences 
between the regions and types of farms are remarkable for 
this feature since large farms have a rental share of 79% on 
average, family farms in Poznan of 36% and family farms 
in Sieradz of 26%
5. Durable investments in rented land 
have not been made by any of the tenants interviewed. 
Figure 2 sums up the arguments given above by presenting 
a rough pattern of the alignment of the characteristics of 
land transactions with elements of land rental contract de-
sign. It, thus, expresses expectations as to contracts that 
should be found on the basis of TCE reasoning in different 
contracting situations. 
4.2 Legislative and customary influences on rental 
contracts 
Certain elements of the formal institutional environment in 
Poland are likely to have an influence on the design of land 
rental contracts.
6 In general, the legal environment of land 
transactions in Poland tends to support written and longer-
term contracts both in transactions that concern state land 
and transactions that concern private land. 
In rental contracts between private farmers, there is a right 
of first refusal for the tenant in case the land he rented in is 
sold, as long as there exists a written lease contract for a 
limited period of time longer than three years or an actual 
                                                           
5   These percentages are calculated for those 80 farms out of the 
258 farms in the survey that have rented land (N=34 for large 
farms, N=30 for Poznan family farms and N=16 for Sieradz 
family farms). 
6   The legal provisions referred to in this section are those that 
were in place during the period covered in the empirical inves-
tigation, 1989 to 2003. The new Act on the Agricultural Sys-
tem has only been in force since July 2003 and does not have 
any relevance for the contracts studied here. 
Figure 2.  Association between transacting parties, characteristics of rented 
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lease having lasted at least 10 years (re-
pealed article 695 § 2 of the Civil Code)
7. 
For certain transactions between private 
individuals, long contracting periods and 
written contracts are necessary because of 
the agricultural social insurance fund 
KRUS. Farmers are only entitled to a dis-
ability or retirement pension from KRUS if 
they give up their agricultural land by either 
passing it on to a successor, or by selling it 
or renting it out under a written 10-year 
contract to an unrelated person (Act on the 
Social Insurance of Farmers). 
A right of first refusal also exists in con-
tracts with the privatisation agency AWRSP, 
in this case after a lease has lasted for at 
least three years (Act on the Management of 
the State Treasury’s Agricultural Real Es-
tate). Another legislative element support-
ing long-term leases from AWRSP are tax 
advantages for up to seven years for rentals 
with a term of at least 10 years (Act on the 
Agricultural Tax). 
Predicting the impact of informal institutions is much more 
difficult. As mentioned before, as far as the aspect of trust 
is concerned, transactions between family farmers are likely 
to be characterised by a high level of trust due to good and 
long-term knowledge. Trust is possibly even more pro-
nounced in transactions between relatives. It is hard to 
establish whether there are any contracting customs dictat-
ing what is considered a “fair” rental contract with respect 
to the characteristics of contracts considered here, but it 
may be safe to assume that traditional ways of contracting 
rather rely on oral and unofficial designs. 
4.3 Rental contracts in the empirical setting 
Table 1 provides information on the numbers of oral and 
written rental contracts of each group of farms in different 
duration categories as found in the survey data. The most 
striking observation is the differences between the groups. 
In comparing large farms and family farms, it becomes 
clear that the former rely exclusively on written contracts, 
while in the latter group a substantial number of oral 
contracts exists. Furthermore, large farms clearly prefer 
longer contract duration (shown by the large number in the 
>6-year category), while family farms make more than half 
of their rentals for a <6-year period. Differences also appear 
between the contracting behaviour of family farms in 
Poznan and Sieradz, as oral and short-term contracts play a 
relatively much higher role in Sieradz than in Poznan. 
In their general tendency, these observations are in keeping 
which the expectations that can be derived from Transac-
tion Cost Economics reasoning. The more farms are in-
volved in transactions of higher risk and higher frequency 
characteristics and the higher the asset-specificity, the more 
pronounced is longer-term and written contracting. Large 
farms rented almost exclusively from the privatisation 
agency and, thus, made the overwhelming majority of their 
contracts with AWRSP. For family farms, the most com-
                                                           
7   The article was repealed by the Act on the Agricultural System. 
See footnote 6. 
mon rental was from other family farms or private persons 
but some also rented from the gmina, AWRSP or other 
bodies. In Sieradz, 14 family farms made contracts with 
other private persons, while two rented from AWRSP. In 
Poznan, similarly, rental from private persons was most 
frequent (18 farms carried out such transactions) and two 
farms contracted with the privatisation agency. In addition, 
there is the substantial number of nine farms who rented 
from the church, the forestry office and the landscape park 
in Poznan.
8 As mentioned above, the share of rented land is 
much higher for large farms than for family farms and 
within the groups of family farms the share of rented land is 
higher in Poznan than in Sieradz. 
The information available from the survey suffers from the 
fact that data was collected only at farm-level and not at 
transaction-level. For this reason, it was impossible to asso-
ciate the characteristics of each individual land transaction 
carried out by the respondents with the design of the re-
spective contract in a discriminative way. The application 
of statistical tests to further quantify the relationships be-
tween variables was, thus, rendered impossible.   
More precise information on the conditions of individual 
transactions was collected in the case studies. In table 2, a 
descriptive cross-tabulation method is used to present the 
characteristics of the 30 land rental contracts recorded in 
the case study villages. The table shows for each contract, 
first, the properties of the transaction represented by the   
constellation of actors involved in the transaction (transact-
ing parties) and the particular characteristics of the rented 
plot or land (share of rented land, size of rented plot) and, 
second, its design features (written/oral, period, specifica-
tions). In addition to this, it is indicated where KRUS regu-
lations played a role, where transacting parties are relatives 
and in which village the contract was made. This method of 
                                                           
8   The fact that the number of contracting farms and number of 
contracts made are not equal is due to the fact that some farms 
made more than one rental contract. The number of contract-
ing farms refers to the year 1998. 
Table 1.   Characteristics of rental contracts of different farms in 
the survey* 








 Oral Written Oral Written  Oral  Written  Oral  Written
1 year
a  0 2 2 11  2 11 0  0 
>1-6 years  0  15  14  26  6  15  8  11 
>6-12 years 0  15  7  11  6  10  1  1 
>12 years 
or open end
0 23  13  9  8  8  5  1 
Sum  0 65  36 57  22 44 14 13 
<1-6 years  17  53  34  19 
>6 years or 
open end 
38 40 32  8 
* The numbers used are the total numbers of rental contracts made by the 258 
enterprises in the sample.
 
a  In the large farm questionnaire, the time spans given were actually 1 year, 1-5 
years, >5-10 years, >10 years and open end. Since this represents only a minor 
distortion, the number of contracts in each category was simply transferred into 
the slightly different categories of the family farm questionnaire displayed here. 
Source: own presentation on the basis of KATO survey data Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 6 
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presentation associates individual contracts directly with 
possible influencing factors, allowing the design to be 
traced back to determinants. Furthermore, by grouping the 
contracts according to transacting parties and villages, table 
2 makes it possible to compare contracts and determinants 
between and within distinct sets.   
For transactions between AWRSP and farmers, table 2 
shows little variance in contract design. This is not surpris-
ing since, as a frequent contractor, AWRSP can save costs 
by not having to negotiate a unique arrangement for every 
transaction it is involved in. The contract design (written, 
long period, high specification)
9 is in correspondence with 
TCE reasoning on uncertainty and frequency as explained 
before. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that 
                                                           
9   Contracts with AWRSP contain detailed requirements for land 
management and precise information on penalties in case the 
demands are not fulfilled, which go so far as to the withdrawal 
of the land from the tenant. 
it is also supported by certain provisions of the legal envi-
ronment, such as the tax advantages for 10-year contracts 
with AWRSP and the right of first refusal. 
The observation that contracts for rentals from the gmina to 
farmers differ from AWRSP transactions in having shorter 
contracting periods and fewer specifications goes together 
with their position in figure 2. Again, institutional features 
support these characteristics. Little general inference can be 
drawn from the one contract with the forestry office but the 
fact that its features are similar to contracts with the gmina 
is in line with expectations. 
Within the set of transactions made between family farm-
ers, there is a substantial degree of variation in contract 
design. Furthermore, there are differences in the frequency 
of certain kinds of contracts between villages that do not 
exist in any of the other constellations of transaction part-
ners. A number of agreements are oral and short-term (or at 
least potentially short-term as they are made for an indefi-
nite period) and little specified. However, the majority are 
Table 2.   Contracts and their characteristics in the three villages P1, P2 and S 
Contract between  Village  Rented plot (land) / 
total land
a 
Written or oral  Period  Specifications 
P1  1 / 16,5  Oral  Unlimited/ indefinite  Few 
  16 / 33  Written  1 year  Few 
  13 / 63 (27 / 63)  Written  10 years  Few 
  11 / 33  Written  10 years
b Few 
  14 / 63 (27 / 63)  Written  10 years
b Few 
  10 / 42  No information  No information  No information 
P2  14 / 38  Written  10 years  Few 
  10 / 45 (27 / 45)  Written  10 years
b Few 
  4 / 50 (30 / 50)  Written  No information  Few 
  5 / 35 (10 / 35)  Written  No information  Few 
S  7 / 30  Oral  Unlimited/ indefinite  Few 
  8 / 40 (18+ / 40)  Oral  Unlimited/ indefinite  Few 
  6 / 14.5  Oral  Unlimited/ indefinite  Few 
   6 / 15
c Oral  Unlimited/  indefinite  Few 
  1.5 / 15
c Oral  3  years  Few 
   8 / 30  Written  5 years  Few 
Family farmers 
  10 / 40 (18+ / 40)  Written  5 years  Few 
P1  3.5 / 13  Written  3 years  Some 
P2  3 / 16  Written  4 years  Some 
  2 / 15  Written  5 years  Some 
Family farmer and 
the gmina 
S  ? / 40  Written  No information  Some 
Family farmer and 
state forestry office 
P2  8 / 50 (30 / 50)  Written  10 years  No information 
P1  5 / 32  Written  10 years  Many 
P2  11 / 38  Written  10 years  Many 
  12 / 50 (30 / 50)  Written  10 years  Many 
  6 / 50 (30 / 50)  Written  10 years  Many 
  5 / 32  Written  10 years  Many 
  5 / 35 (10 / 35)  Written  10 years  Many 
  11 / 27  Written  10 years  Many 
Family farmer and 
AWRSP 
  17 / 45 (27 / 45)  Written  10 years  Many 
a  Gives the size of the plot subject to the transaction in relation to the size of the whole farm of the tenant. In case the plot is not the 
only one the tenant rents in, the total size of rented land in relation to the size of the whole farm is shown in brackets. Where the 
whole size of rented land is unknown, the lower limit is indicated (e.g. 18+) 
b  The desire to obtain a pension from KRUS was given as the reason for selecting this type of contract 
c  Transaction with relatives 
Source: own presentation on the basis of case study data Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 6 
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written and many have long contracting periods, which 
TCE reasoning cannot account for. The design only makes 
sense when paying attention to the fact that for some trans-
actions between family farmers legal regulations are of 
relevance that are a force in the direction of written and 
longer-term agreements. Predominant in this respect is the 
need to comply with standards in order to qualify for a 
KRUS pension, another influence is the advantage that a 
written contract of at least three years has in terms of the 
right of first refusal. 
With respect to the category “rented plot (land) / total 
land”, the small number of observations in the case studies 
does not allow clear patters to be established. The same is 
true for transactions between relatives. Differences in con-
tract structures between villages, such as the fact that only 
in S are a large number of contracts between family farmers 
found to be oral, may be due the fact that in this more tradi-
tional village people still rely more on habitual ways of 
making arrangements (cf. also HURRELMANN, 2004). 
5. Conclusions 
The objective of this article was to shed light on the questi-
on of why certain land rental contracts are used in particular 
situations, paying special attention to the joint impact of the 
properties of the transaction on the one hand and the institu-
tional environment on the other.  
The results of the empirical analysis support the idea that 
the attributes of the transaction (uncertainty, frequency, 
asset-specificity) have an influence on the way in which 
land rental agreements are designed, defined here by the 
characteristics written/oral, contracting period and specifi-
cations. Especially the features high uncertainty and high 
frequency are found to encourage longer-term, written and 
highly specified contract designs. However, it also becomes 
clear that there are cases where the explanation based on 
properties of the transaction is not sufficient, because legal 
regulations affecting the land market exert a direct and 
opposing influence on contrating decisions. In particular in 
the case of contracts between family farmers, not only the 
short-term and oral agreements that the properties of the 
transaction approach would suggest are used, but also con-
tracts that are written and longer-term. This can be traced 
back to the legal setting, which requires or encourages 
formalisation and longer duration in certain contracting 
situations. Where such formal demands apply to land rental 
transactions, their effects can often be seen to be so perva-
sive that they outweigh the impact of the transactions’ at-
tributes. 
At the theoretical level, these outcomes underline the im-
portance of establishing the link between Transaction Cost 
Economics and the Economics of Property Rights. In order 
to come to meaningful explanations of contract choice in 
“real world” conditions, it seems necessary to combine the 
insights generated in the two strands of theory to achieve 
full explanatory power. The observations made in this study 
caution especially against applying Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics in ignorance of the rules set by the institutional 
environment, as this may mean disregarding a very relevant 
set of determinants. 
For policy makers in Poland, the results obtained here pro-
vide the opportunity to consider whether the observed con-
sequences of particular legal regulations are really desired. 
In some cases, the influence of certain laws on contracting 
structures may rather be a side effect of policies aimed at 
achieving results in other areas, than an intended outcome. 
An example of  this are the KRUS regulations for agricul-
tural pensions, which are most likely primarily supposed to 
encourage older farmers to leave the sector, not to prolong 
contracting periods. In particular with respect to the regula-
tions that promote long contract durations in family farm 
settings, it could be asked whether this may not lead to an 
undesirable lack of flexibility of  the farming sector in 
adjusting quickly to changes in external conditions. 
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the analysis clearly 
indicates the limitations of the two data sets that were used. 
For the survey data, these limitations consist in the fact that 
information concerns only the farm level and not the trans-
action level, making it impossible to relate particular con-
tracts to particular properties of the transaction one-to-one. 
The case study data does allow each individual transaction 
to be followed but contains a limited number of observa-
tions so that for some characteristics of the transaction it is 
not possible to establish any clear patterns of influence. The 
results obtained here suggest that a promising approach to 
gaining further information on contract design would be to 
create a large “transaction databank” containing detailed 
information on each land rental transaction carried out by 
farmers in a survey, which would also make the application 
of statistical tests possible. The general design of this data-
bank could be oriented on the example provided in this 
study. 
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FRIEDRICH KUHLMANN (2003):  
Betriebslehre der Agrar- und Ernährungswirtschaft. 2. Auflage.  
DLG-Verlag, Frankfurt; 603 S.; ISBN 3 769 00613 5; € 29,90 
Die erste Auflage von Friedrich Kuhlmanns „Einführung in 
die Betriebswirtschaftslehre für den Agrar- und Ernäh-
rungsbereich“ war bereits das „etwas andere“ Lehrbuch. 
Von den übrigen Standardwerken unterscheidet es sich in 
zweierlei Hinsicht: Zum einen durch die Abdeckung des 
agrar- und ernährungswirtschaftlichen Bereichs, was impli-
ziert, dass auch Themengebiete behandelt werden, die in 
der Masse der landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe eine geringere 
Rolle spielen. Dazu gehören z.B. personalwirtschaftliche 
Fragestellungen, das Beschaffungs- und Lagermanagement 
oder das betriebliche Marketing. Außerdem ist das Buch 
klar entscheidungs- und handlungsorientiert und lässt dar-
über hinaus ein deutliches didaktisches Konzept erkennen, 
wie man es typischerweise bei den „Textbooks“ des angel-
sächsischen Sprachraums vorfindet. 
Die 2003 erschienene zweite Auflage mit dem Titel „Be-
triebslehre der Agrar- und Ernährungswirtschaft“ ist diesem 
Grundkonzept treu geblieben, was dem Buch weiterhin eine 
Sonderstellung verleiht. Inhaltlich wurde es gründlich über-
arbeitet, wobei das Stoffgebiet sowohl erweitert als auch 
vertieft wurde, was schon im Umfang des Buches deutlich 
wird. Es umfasst jetzt 600 Seiten, was – bei Berücksichti-
gung der reduzierten Schriftgröße – gegenüber der ersten 
Auflage mehr als eine Verdopplung bedeutet.   
Als eigenes Kapitel neu aufgenommen wurde die Entschei-
dungsfindung bei unvollkommener Information. Dafür ist 
das vormals abschließende Kapitel über Steuerungsinstru-
mente weggefallen. Sein Inhalt wurde auf die Abschnitte zu 
den einzelnen Handlungsfeldern verteilt, was vom didakti-
schen Standpunkt her zu begrüßen ist. Zusammen mit der 